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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE E. ANDRTTS, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 10282 
IDA ALLRED, 
Defendant 1rnd Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
8TATE_\iEl'JT OF ~I1HE NATURE OF THE CASE 
'l1his is an adi on for personal injuries arising out 
of an autornouil<' aceident wherein plaintiff, a passenger, 
f P 11 out of defendant's car 1\·hich started to roll forward 
after defendant had gotten out and as plaintiff was pre-
1)aring to aljght therefrom. 
DlSPOSl1l1ION" IN LOvVER COURT 
At the pr<:>-hial conference both parties made mo-
tions for a ~'umrnary judgnwnt. Plaintiff's motion for 
s1m1rnnr.\· judgme11t was granted and defendant's denied. 
De£'t,rnlnnt appeals from the trial court's order and judg-
ment. 
1 
RELIEF SOL'UilT ON APPE.:c\l .. 
Defendant seeks revenml of the sunnnary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff and judg1mmt in her favor as a 
matter of law. 
STATE~lENrr OF rrHE FACTS 
The following facts which are undisputed are dis-
closed by the published deposition of the plaintiff and the 
answers to interrogatories filed by the defendant. 
Plaintiff resides at -!-!81 8outh 9th East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (Deposition H. 32, page 3.) She and the 
defendant, Ida Allred, have know11 l·ach other for many 
years. Mrs. Allred's daughter married l\lrs. Andrus' son 
over 18 years ago. (Deposition, (R. 5~) page 5.) 
On February 8, 19G-! at about 'i' :30 P.111. l\lrs. Allred, 
the defendant, called at the plaintiff's home to make a 
social visit. Defendant invited plaintiff to go with her 
to Harman's Cafe at 39th South and State Street for 
dinner. Each paid for her own dinner and Mrs. Andrus 
did not pay anything for the ride. She was riding as a 
guest in the car. (Ans\n,rs to interrogatories, .Nos. 4 
and 5, (R. 8), Deposition, (R. 52), Pages 5 and Li.) 
The plaintiff and defendant went to Harman's Cafe 
in the defendant's 1950 Cadillac which was equipped with 
an automatic transmission. After they had eaten they 
then returned to plaintiff's home, it then being about 9 :30 
P.M. Defendant brought the car to a stop directly in 
front of plaintiff's home at the gate where the sidewalk 
leads into her front porch. (Answers to interrogatories, 
Nos. 3 and 9) (R. 8, 9 
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Si1(~ a1iplir·(l her foot to the foot brake, left the motor 
nuii1 ing and tJ1onglit sh<~ Jiad pulled up the emergency 
hrake, hut rna:1T not have pulled it on full. The car was 
left in driVl' g~·~u. (Answers to interrngatories, Nos. 6, 7 
and 8) ( H. 8, 9) 
'The ('ar was fating north and standing on a wide 
grayel shoulder. _;-\] u part of the car was on the hard sur-
fac1c'. The gl'avel shoulder ~was (1uite level. (R. 52) (De-
position, pages 8 and 9) 
After talking for a fow minutes the defendant got 
out of the car 011 tlw drivl'1·'~; side to go around on the 
passenger's side of the car to assist the plaintiff out of 
tlrn car, although ll1is had not been her habit on previous 
occasjons. (A11s\n~rn to interrogatories, No. 10) (R. 9) 
As she started arnund the back of the car she heard the 
plaintiff holler that the car was rolling. She ran back 
to get in foe left side of the ('ar to stop it but did not 
get under tlie wheel of the car until it about came to a 
stop. By that time the plaintiff had fallen out of the car 
and wa::i lying on the grnund in an injured condition. 
'l1lie plaintiff opened the door to get out and as she 
did so the car started to roll forward, while she was still 
sitting on the seat. Reference is made to her deposition 
for her °''·Tn account. (TI. 52) Page 7, Line 17 to Page 8, 
Line 9. 
''Q. Now, were you inside the car when it started 
to roll Z 
A. Y (_•s, partly. I was partly inside of the car 
when j t started to roll. 
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Q. N o'lv, which part of you was inside, and which 
part was out 1 
A. This side; my left side. 
Q. Your left side was in? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. vVas your right foot outside 7 
A. No. My left foot was inside of the car. 
Q. Yes, and how about your right foot 7 
A. Well, it was outside. It was on the-
Q. Had it touched the ground 7 
A. I can't remember that. 
Q. You just-
A. Just on foot, there. 
Q. It was just hanging out the door, kind of, 
was it 7 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. I see. And then the car started to roll for-
ward, did it? 
A. It started to roll, just started rolling. That's 
all. 
Q. To the north, started to roll to the north 7 
A. Yes. * * * 
Q. How far did the car roll before you were 
thrown out, do you suppose 7 
A. About forty feet, I think." 
Page 9, Lines 18 to 20. 
"Q. Now you opened the door yourself to the 
car did you¥ 
A. Yes. I opened the door myself and was start-
ing to get out when the ca"r started to roll." 
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Pag·e 11, Liw•s 1 to '.20. 
··<r N(Jw, wl1c·n tlit· <'ar started forward, then, you 
\\('l'P still sitting down on the seat, were you1 
A. Yt>s. Yes, I \\·as. I was sitting sideways on 
tht· seat. ·was just going to get out, and I had 
a hold of the door with this hand. 
(~. \VhieJi way wen• you facing? Towards the 
front of tlw c-ar, or towards the door1 
A. \Vell, was facing that way. I must have been 
faei11g that way to be a hold of the door, 
wouldn't 11 
(~. \Vell, l dun't know. You could reach out to the 
side and opt>n it. Do you recall which way you 
wt~n~ facing when you opened the door1 
A. \Vdl, I \vm; facing to the east when I opened 
the door, sure. 
Q. All right. But yon were sitting on the seat? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And you sa:· :·ou rolled about forty feet be-
fon'. you fell out? 
A. \Yell, tlw car did. I don't know how many 
fed it was when I was throwed out." 
111 smrnnary, the plaintiff's testimony is that she took 
hold of tlw cloor handlP, opened the door turning sideways 
in tlH' St'at to get out, and that she still had hold of 
the door hand],. as the car started rolling forward. Her 
left foot she says was iu the car and her right was hang-
ing ont the door. Slw finally lost her balance and fell 
out tlH· right sidP of the car after traveling about 40 feet. 
ri1here is no evidence to the contrary. 
Thne \'.·as r:o evi<lP1w~· of intoxieation or wilful mis-
eondnet arnl the qltl'st ion is whetlwr, under these facts, 
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the plaintiff was or was not, at the time of the accident, 
a guest within the meaning of the Gtah guest statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCI-
DENT THE PLAINTIFF WAS STILL A GUEST IN THE 
DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE. 
Utah's Guest Statute, Section 41-9-1, U.C.A. 1953 
provides as follows : 
"Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in 
any vehiclP, moying upon any of the public high-
ways of the state of Utah, and while so riding 
as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall 
have no right of recovery against the owner or 
driver or person responsible for the operation of 
such vehicle.***" 
Section 41-9-2 provides: 
"Guest defined. For the purpose of this sec-
tion the term 'guest' is hereby defined as being 
a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without 
giving compensation then•for." 
Street or Highway defined, Section 41-1-1 (bb) 
"The entire width between property lines of 
every way or place of whatever nature when any 
part thereof is open to the public, as a matter of 
right, for purposes of vehicular traffic." 
rrhe purposes of various legislatures in enacting 
guest statutes have been set forth in many cases. A few 
of these purposes are herein set forth as follows : To deny 
recovery for negligence against one transporting in his 
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aLtto11ioliil1' a ttwutlln <,;- his family, a Ro<'ial guest or a 
ca:-;ual imii1·(·, man adion brought by the recipient of 
his ho:-;1;it<1Lt:,, Jl_rnz_ie c. 8011dcrs, Calif., 1-±3 P(2) 70-t; 
to i1revent mw \1-ho tnlY('lPcl with another in an auto-
mobile as a guest, or ,,-ithout compensation, from re-
covPring unk•ss it was proven that the driver was guilty 
of gross 11eglig<·nce or wilful and wanton misconduct, 
J11hos.: r. Ba;-to11, Fla., 1 80. (2) -±7G. 
Jn the ease of' J c11sc11 1. M uwer, -±Utah (2) 336, our 
<~ourt has statvd iis <1pinion: 
"'l1 liat in tlw adoption of this statute the 
legislature sought to rPliPve the hardship which 
is visited upon a generous driver who is sued by 
an i11vit<·<l rider for onlinary nPgligence of the 
driwr wlwn the rider gave nothing to compen-
sat<' the driver for the transportation." 
Lt has h(~en held that, being in dt>rogation of common 
law, such statutPs are to be construed strictly. Calif., 
Pra9er r. Israel, 9S P. (2) 729. On the other hand, it 
ha:-; ahio bcPn held that the gm'st statutes should be liber-
ally co:ru;trued to eff ectuatP their purpose. Iowa, Nielsen 
v. Kohlslrcdt, ll7 ff\V (2) 900, Vol.-± Blashfield Cyclo-
pedia of Automobil<: Law and Practict>, Perm. Edition, 
-~ '.2313, Page 363. 
It is undisputed that defendant's vehicle was on the 
shoulder of the highway and that the place where the 
deft,ndant's vehiele stopped to allow the driver and pass-
<'nger to get out, as well as the shoulder along which the 
veliieh~ rolled after defondant alighted from the vehicle, 
\\'t'n' 01wn to ili<-' public as a matter of right for purposes 
of vehicular traffic. 
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It is also undisputed that the plaintiff was still \\·ithin 
th':: vehicle \Yhen it starteu to roll forward and fell out of 
the vrlticl<' \\·hile it was in motion on such highway. 
r:nw plaintiff, therefore, fall::.; \\·ithin the gue::.;t statute 
trchnically ::.;peaking. 
Plaintiff contend::.; and the trial court found that the 
ride hau ended when the car stopped in front of the plain-
tiff's home, even though the plaintiff had not safely 
alighted from the car, and that the car was not still mov-
ing on the highway ·within the meaning of the guest stat-
ute when the plaintiff was injured. (R 38) 
At least 2() states have enacted guest statutes which 
vary somewhat from ::.;tate to ::.;tate. JHost of them pro-
vide that no person transported by the owner or operator 
of a motor vehicle a::.; hi::.; gue::.;t without payment for such 
tran::.;portation shall be liable, etc., and make no mention 
of while riding on a higlnvay. 
Utah, :Nevada, 1'rxas, North Dakota and California 
have statut<"'s s~milar to each other which provide that 
any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle 
moving upon a public highway (or being transported 
upon a public highway) cannot recover unless the driver 
is guilty of wilful or wanton conduct, etc. 
Counsel has bern unable to find any case in which a 
coart has gone as far as plaintiff asks this court to go in 
holding that the guest relationship had terminated at the 
time of plaintiff's injury. The case of Prager v. Israel, 
1940, Calif. 98 P ( 2) 729, relied upon by plaintiff in sup-
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iH'rt of plai11td'l"s po,-.;ition 1~; distinguishable in that in 
tlw 1>rag·(·1· c;l0c· tlH· plai11tifl' did havP one foot on the 
grnu11d, ;Jl l1 <t ;t alld was not sitting on the seat. In our 
<'<tse plaintiff \\as c0111 pldl·ly st•ated in the automobile 
and no part of Jin l>()(ly touched the ground before the 
ear started rolling. ln the Prager case the car had been 
sto1Jped for se\Teral hour:::;. ln our case the motor was still 
running and the uu had !wen stopped for only about five 
rninutPs. TlH• ear was sl ill on a portion of the highway 
ns<"d for n•gular trafli<' purposes. The plaintiff was still 
1lefinitely within the automobile. 
r:I 1he qnesiion wJ1etJwr at the time of injury there has 
been a t\·rmination of the host-guest relationship between 
the driver of an autornohile and one ridng therein within 
the meaning of a statute, (or of the rule established even 
in the abseuee of statuk in some jurisdictions) holding 
the driver of a motor vehick• liable for an injury to a 
guc:::;t only in ca:::;e of gross or wilful negligence depends 
upon the provisions of the statute (where there are stat-
utes) and upon the facts involved in the particular cases. 
No general rule can be stated governing the determination 
of these questiom;. 14-6 ALR 682, Annotation. 
In some cases a distinrtion as to whether or not one 
was or is a guest within the meaning of the guest statute 
depends upon whether the statute requires one to be in 
or upon the vehicle at the time of the accident. In the 
absence of statutt' tJH• same rule is often applied. (Al-
though no so-called guest statute exists in l\lassachusetts, 
it is there 1H·ld under their common law that an automo-
liile ho:-;t i:::; not liable for an injury to a guest in the ab-
sence· of gross negligence.) 
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In th2 case of Adams v. Baker, I\Iass., 1945, 59 NE 
(~) 701, plaintiff, a gratuitous guest, fell while alighting 
from the defendant's vehicle. As she stepped from the 
ri(J'ht Joor of the tar her right foot went into about a 
b 
three inch hole along the right edge of the highway. The 
only question was whether tlu~ guest relationship had 
tPnninated. The trial court held as a matter of law that 
the guest relationship on these facts had not h~rminated. 
rrhP Supreme Court on appeal stated: 
"'l1hcre i,yas no error in the action of the 
judge in allowing defendant's motion for directed 
verdict. Upon the evidence the jury 1vould have 
bee11 obliged to find that the plaintiff was partly 
in or upon the cl<·frndant's vehicle at the time of 
the accident, and that the gratuitous undertaking 
had not been terminated. * '~ * The stopping of the 
automobile and the departure of the plaintiff 
therefrom were nece;3~u·y to the conclusion of the 
gratui tious undertaking." 
In the case of li,'skelnwn v. ·wilson, 1948, Ohio, 80 
NE (2) 803, where defendant had transported plaintiff 
to a social gatlu~1iag and before beginning on return 
trip the plaintiff i,r,·ent into the car but alighted vi711en 
defendant could not find her l;:eys and stepped a\vay 
about 2 fed and foe vehicle, Yd1ik moving bacl~war<l, 
struck the plaintiff, the plaintiff when injured was not 
"in or 'Upon said motor i 0ehicle," and was not a "guest" 
within the guest statute. Defendant contended plaintiff 
was still a guest. rnie court said, ''To hold as defendant 
contends would n~l1uire the elimination from the statute 
of the wurds "iu or upon said motor -rchicle." (Italics 
ours.) 
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I. I . ·1 'I' ·•' 11· .,-<)J]] \ ·JOO 11·) ]! ( J(• (';[,;(• O[ ((1 1tJ.•: I. I I/. /OS,.).), . , lJlJ. _JJ, ._. 
\E (:2) 1:_::;, tl!1• 1Jlain1if'I' \\<t8 ridiJ1g as a gnest in ave-
liicl<' t)1-i\'i·;1 !1.·· l11"· 1rn~ku1d I\ 110 \\·as <lriving as agent 
of' his ratltc•J', UH· df'l'('J](lm1t i11 tlie adion. The plaintiff 
sudd('nly djscov1·n·d that h«r imrse was missing and 
tlu' driver stopp<'d tlw v<'hicle so that the plaintiff could 
d1eelz and se(• if tlw pun;(• was in the vehicle. She opened 
the door, got 11ut and seareltc•d for tl1e purne, but was un-
able to fjncl it. ~11<' had om· foot on tlw running board 
and one on th1~ grnund and \ms preparing to close the 
door whe11 the truck lureh<'d suddenly forward and 
struck and injured th\'. plaiutiff. rJ'he question was 
\\'hdht'l' or not tll<· plaintiff was sb11 a guest under the 
eircurnstarn•(;s. The trial C'Ourt held as a matter of law 
tliat the pbintiff was a g1wst a11d limited her right of 
act ion to l'('( overy und<'r the grn:st statute. Plaintiff cited 
in her ]Jl'id the ease of Prrtf;er v. Israel, the California 
cast~. rl1he eonrt rejected the n·asoning in the California 
ease and stated that the primary purpose of statutory 
construction is to asc<'rtain the intention of the legisla-
ture, not only from the language used, but also from the 
reason and necessit~, for the ad, the evil sought to be 
remedied and the object and purposes sought to be 
oLtained Ly it. Citing casPs. 
'l1he reasonillg of the court in aniving at its decision 
is set forth herein as we fed that is helpful in the inter-
pretation of our own guest statute. 
"'11 hat there should be a difference between 
tlie liability of a iw1·son who, out of the generosity 
of lli8 heart, r0nders gratuitously some service to 
his follow traveler over those rendering such 
st•rvice for hire and barter, can hardly be ques-
11 
tionrd. Thos(~ who are charitably inclined should 
not be restrained by fear of the consequences of 
their mvn charitable act and the recipients should 
not be permitted to gain by the generosity of their 
host. Undoubtedly the Legislature, in adopting 
this act, was aware of the frequency of litigation in 
which passengers, carried gratuitously in automo-
bles. have sought the recovery of large sums for 
injn~·ies all(~ged to have been due to negligent 
operation, and when•, in the use of the automobile, 
which is almost universaJ, generous drivers might 
find themselves involved in litigation that often 
turned npon questions of ordinary negligence. It 
was evidently the intention of the Legislature not 
only to correct t11is abuse hut to promote the best 
inten~sts of the people in their relation to each 
other.' 
''A narrow or liju·ral inte.cpretation of the \Yords 
'person riding in a motor vehicle as a guest, with-
out payment for such ride,' limiting the dfect of 
the statute to aecidents occuning 1vhen a guest 
is seated in an automobile jn motion, would defeat 
or at least impair, the purpose of the legislation. 
To give fnll effect to the legislative intent a gener-
ous owner or driver must be protected at all times 
that the relation of host and guest exists in con-
nection with the free ride. The begmning and 
end of that relation is not unlilrn the beginning and 
end of the relation of carrier and passenger for 
hire in a public conveyance. In the latter case the 
relation begins with the attempt of the passenger 
to enter the conveyance and ends when he has 
alighted in safety ~n completion of the journey. 
It is not interrupted or terminated by a temporary 
absence from the convevance for a reasonable and 
usual purpose. 10 Arn~ J ur., Carriers, page 33, 
3~1, 54 and 56. So, the relation of host and guest 
between automobile owner or driver and a pass-
enger riding without payment or compensation 
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iwp,111:-; \\J1<·11 tl1(' .i~w·st att(·rnpts to <•nfrr the auto-
111oh1 ii\ alld <>ml;:; onl.\ \\ IH·11 h(~ has safoly alighted 
a( 1 lH· <'11d f1l· i lt1• J id(>. H(•re the ride had not ter-
1!li 11at< d. l'laintili' \\as i11jun~d bdore she reached 
ltLT L1e~1 im1t ion Tlw stopping of the automobile 
to p(·nHit J'urtlil'l' :-:(·arch for plaintiff's purse and 
the ad of plaintiff in gdting out of the car to 
mon· effedively rnak<> the search, were usual and 
customary arts irn~idental to a normal courtesy to 
plaintiff as defemlant's guest. ~he did not lose 
her status as a guest." 
Sedion ~)-201 Ill. Anno. Statute, 1958, p(,nn. Ed., pro-
vicles: 
··No penwn riding in or upon a motor vehicle 
* < * as a guest without payment for such ride 
* * ~- shall have a causP of action for damage 
against the driver or 01wrator of such vehicle un-
l<·~s such acci<lvnt shall have been caused by wil-
ful an<l wanton rnil'.lconduet of the driver or oper-
ator. * * *" 
In the case of Bandolph v. W el;u, Ill., 1963, 194 NE 
(2) 118 in an adion by a gut>::st against the driver of a 
vd1ide for injuries received as she was putting money in 
a parking meter wlwn the host's car rolled forward and 
injurPd her, the court held that she was not a guest within 
the statute and that the "host-guest relationship within 
the gtwst statute begins ·when the guest attempts to enter 
the automobile and en<ls when he has safely alighted at 
the end of the ride." 
In the case of Fra11kl'11stein v. House, Calif., 1940, 
107 P (:2) 6:2-±, ·wht'l"P an elderly woman accepted an in-
\'itation to ride a::; guest uf the owner of a ear and entered 
the rar, bn t the owner abs en frd Ji imse If tPmporarily, and 
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the car rolled down the hill earnsmg the woman to be 
thrnwn tlic,1·efrom, the woman remained a guest at all 
tunes until she was thro1rn to the street and couldn't 
rt>cover on the owner's simple negligence. The conrt said, 
"As long as a person without compensation to the driver 
has entered a car upon the invitation of such driver and 
rema:ns in the vehicle upon a highway during such ride, 
he is a guest." 
An annotation in 50 ALR (2) comml'ncing at Page 
97·1 contains nnmerons cases 1vith a wide variety of facts 
pertaining to guests injured after having alighted or 
while alighting from the host's car. These cases all ap-
pear to be consistent with the decision urged upon fois 
coart hy your appellant herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case clearly bring the plaintiff with-
in the purview of the Utah guest statute and there being 
no wilful misconduct or intoxication involved the trial 
court's decision granting plaintiff a summary judgment 
should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the 
defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI and 
LA ~WRE~·-rCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant arnd 
Defendant 
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